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RECENT CASES
FEDERAL INCOME TAX-RESIDENCE LOCATED APART FROM
PREMISES WHERE EMPLOYEE PERFORMED DUTIES Is NOT "ON
THE BUSINESS PREMISES OF THE EMPLOYER" AS REQUIRED BY
1954 INT. REV. CODE SECTION 119; RENTAL VALUE OF RESI-
DENCE AND VALUE OF FOOD SUPPLIED BY EMPLOYER NOT Ex-
CLUDABLE FROM GROSS INCOME. Commissioner v. Anderson
(6th Cir. 1966).
Charles Anderson was employed by the Lincoln Lodge Corporation
to manage a motel near Columbus, Ohio. When the motel opened for
business, Mr. Anderson, his wife, and their three children occupied
a two-room suite in the motel. A year later, Mr. Anderson complained
to his employer about the overcrowded conditions and requested more
adequate quarters. After considering the loss of revenue that would
result if Mr. Anderson were permitted to occupy additional space
within the motel, the Corporation decided that Anderson and his
family should live off the premises.
Anderson's preference for a particular two-story house located
several blocks from the motel was rejected by the Corporation because
Anderson was required to be available twenty-four hours a day in order
to supervise the operation of the motel. The Corporation considered
constructing a residence on the motel property, but rejected the idea,
since the land was too valuable for such use. Instead, Lincoln Lodge
purchased a vacant lot two blocks from the motel and constructed a
single-family residence upon it. This lot was the closest available
property zoned for single-family residence. Anderson and his family
resided in the house during the taxable years involved-1958, 1959
and 1960-without charge. In addition, the employer paid all utilities
at the house, furnished laundry and dry cleaning services and fur-
nished food valued at $300.00 per year.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the Tax Court,1
held that the value of the meals and the lodging' was not excludable
from gross income because the meals and lodging were not furnished
1 Charles N. Anderson, 42 T.C. 410 (1964) (house qualified as business premises
when acquired to satisfy need for larger quarters; furthermore, motel revenues in-
creased by renting space vacated by Anderson).
2 The Tax Court found the value of the lodging to be $3,120.00 per year and the
value of the food to be $300.00 per year. These findings were not disputed.
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"on the business premises of the employer" as required by Section 119
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.3 Commissioner v. Anderson,
371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966).
Section 119 provides that the taxpayer may exclude from gross
income the value of any meals or lodging furnished him by his em-
ployer for the "convenience of the employer" only if the meals are
furnished on the business premises of the employer; or, in the case of
lodging, if the employee is required to accept such lodging on the
business premises of the employer as a condition of his employment.4
No issue was raised in the present case with respect to the conclusions
of the Tax Court that the meals and lodging were furnished for the
convenience of the employer, or that Anderson was required to
accept the lodging as a condition of his employment.5 However, the
majority of the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the conclusion of the
Tax Court that the house qualified as "business premises of the em-
ployer."
District Judge Wilson,( writing for the majority, concluded that
the phrase "the business premises of the employer" means either a
place where the employee performs a significant portion of his duties,
or premises where the employer conducts a significant portion of his
business.7 Thus, in defining "business premises," the emphasis centers
upon the place where duties of the employee are to be performed
rather than upon the employer's ownership or control of the particular
premises.' For support, the court pointed to the pertinent Treasury
regulation, which provides: "For purposes of this section [meals and
lodging], the term 'business premises of the employer' generally
means the place of employment of the employee.. .. "
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 119. MEALS OR LODGING FURNISHED FOR THE CON-
VENIENCE OF THE EMPLOYER.
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any meals
or lodging furnished to him by his employer for the convenience of the employer,
but only if-
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business premises of the
employer, or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept such lodging on the
business premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.
4 See generally Wolfe, Tax Treatment of Meals and Lodging, 28 N.Y. CERT. PUB.
ACCOUNTANT 344 (1958).
5 Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 62 (6th Cir. 1966).
6 Frank W. Wilson, District Judge, Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by
designation.
7 371 F.2d at 67.
8 Id. at 64.
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (1956). "While the Court is not bound by Treasury reg-
ulations where they are inconsistent with the statute which they seek to interpret and
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The court then reviewed several other cases where the phrase "on
the business premises of the employer" has been construed. United
States v. Barrett0 presented the question whether Mississippi highway
patrolmen were entitled to exclude reimbursement by the state for
meals purchased at various locations along the highway while on
duty. The Fifth Circuit held that the value of the meals taken at
restaurants along the highway was excludable, since the business of
law enforcement was not confined to patrol headquarters, but rather,
covered every road in the state.1 The Eighth Circuit reached a similar
result in United States v. Morelan,12 concluding that restaurants near
or adjacent to highways were on the business premises of the em-
ployer.'3
Barrett and Morelan reflect a liberal interpretation of "business
premises," for Judge Wilson emphasized that in both cases the court
rejected the Commissioner's contention that "business premises"
would be limited to premises owned or controlled by the employer.14
The decisions are consistent with the Anderson view that the premises
must be those upon which some portion of the employee's duties is per-
formed.' 5 Exactly what "duties" a highway patrolman performs in a
restaurant "near" the highway was not mentioned by the Anderson
court.'0 The court turned directly to the case in which it felt the rule
was stated, United States junior Chamber of Commerce v, United
States.'7 There, the issue was the excludability of the rental value of a
implement, they must be sustained unless unreasonable or plainly inconsistent with the
statute, and may, where long continued without substantial change, be deemed to
have received Congressional approval and have the effect of law. Morrison v. United
States, 355 F.2d 218 (C.A. 6 1966)." 371 F.2d at 64-65.
10 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
11 "The Commissioner takes too narrow a view of what constitutes the 'business
premises' of the Mississippi Highway Patrol. . . . [I]t is unrealistic to treat the
employer's place of business as limited to state patrol headquarters. This criterion
. is not decisive against the excludability of the sums here in question." Id. at 912.
1 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
13 "It is conceivable ... to call all state land the business premises of the state since
the state can regulate, tax and exercise a great deal of control over the land. Such is not
true of a private employer, whose business premises are arguably limited to that which
can be controlled and regulated by him." Id. at 203.
14 The fact that both courts rejected the Commissioner's contention does not seem
authority for the proposition that ownership by the employer of the property in
question is immaterial for purposes of determining whether that property is "business
premises" under Section 119. Barrett and Morelan merely say that the fact that the
employer has no property interest in the premises will not preclude it from qualifying
as business premises.
15 371 F.2d at 65.
16 While taking meals on duty it was standard procedure to leave the patrol car
next to the road and give the dispatcher the phone number of the restaurant. United
States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199, 201 (8th Cir. 1966).
17 334 F.2d 660 (Ct. Cl., 1964).
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house provided for the national president of the organization. The
Court of Claims found that a portion of the president's duties were
performed at the home, and then declared the rule: "We think that
the business premises of § 119 means premises of the employer on
which the duties of the employee are to be performed.""8
The Anderson court deemed Dole v. Commissioner9 "even more
pertinent" to its decision. There the majority of the Tax Court con-
strued the phrase "on the business premises" to mean either: (1)
Living quarters that constitute an integral part of the business prop-
erty or (2) premises upon which the company carries bn some of its
business activities.20 Judge Raum, concurring in Dole, disapproved of
the Tax Court decision in Anderson in these words:
The matter probably would never have reached this present state
of apparent confusion and disagreement among the members of
this Court were it not for the unreviewed decision in Charles N.
Anderson . . . . I think that Anderson is distinguishable for the
reason articulated in the majority opinion. But I also think that it is
wrong and that it should be overruled to put an end to the confusion
that it has created (emphasis added).21
The Court of Appeals, affirming Dole in a per curiam opinion,2 did
so on the basis of Judge Raum's opinion. The fact that Judge Raum's
comments regarding Anderson were mere dicta did not prevent the
court in the instant case from labelling Dole "even more pertinent."
23
Judge McAllister, dissenting to Anderson, felt that the construction
of Section 119 advocated by the Commissioner was "based on an
obsession with words; ... narrow and extreme; and ... unjustified by
the purposes of the statute, and contrary to the intention of Con-
gress," 24 since Congress did not intend to put geographic bounds on
the business premises of an employer .2 According to a narrow con-
struction of Section 119, patrolmen would not be consuming their
meals "on" the business premises of the employer when dining at a
18 Id. at 664-65.
29 351 F.2d 308 (1965), a/firming per curiam 43 T.C. 697 (1965). Supervisory
employees were directed to live in company-owned houses one mile and more from
the mill where they worked. Held: The employees were not entitled to exclude rental
value since living in particular houses was unnecessary to perform duties properly; and,
the houses were not on business premises.
20 43 T.C. at 707.
21 Id. at 709.
22 351 F.2d 308 (1965).
23 371 F.2d at 65.
24 Id. at 77.
25 371 F.2d at 75, citing United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
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private restaurant on private premises at a distance of a half a block
from a highway. Yet, as the minority pointed out, both Barrett and
Morelan, cited by the majority, decided directly contrary to such
narrow construction.
26
Applying the rule of Chamber of Commerce, the dissent discussed
whether the premises in question were premises on which the duties
of the employee Anderson were performed. Anderson was on
twenty-four hour call and his duties included handling complaints,
answering questions, overseeing reservations, and supervising the
operation of the restaurant. These duties were usually discharged in
person at the motel, but some duties were handled by telephone from
his home. In addition, he occasionally entertained motel guests in
the home furnished by his employer. These facts led to the conclusion
that Anderson performed a portion of his duties in the house provided
by his employer. 28 It would appear that a motel manager awaiting
a phone call from his reservations clerk about a problem is not unlike
a state highway patrolman in a restaurant awaiting a phone call from
his dispatcher, which was the situation in Barrett20 and Morelan.0
Judge McAllister had difficulty understanding why the First Cir-
cuit in Dole affirmed solely on the basis of Judge Raum's Tax Court
concurring opinion which called for the reversal of Anderson. His
difficulty stemmed from the fact that the Dole case was distinguish-
able from Anderson, and the decision in Dole could have no bearing
on Anderson, which was at that time pending on appeal to the Sixth
Circuit. Further, he felt that the decision in Dole suffered from
insufficient development of the issues, and the resolution of the
problem . . . lack[ed] the thrust, persuasiveness, and marshalling
of argument necessary to overcome the well-reasoned conclusions of
all but three judges of the Tax Court .... 31
26 Judge McAllister also considered Boykin v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 249 (8th
Cir. 1958), where the Commissioner failed to raise the "business premises" question
in the case of a physician who resided in a house provided by the government which
was some distance from the hospital where he performed his duties. From this "failure"
on the part of the Commissioner, Judge McAllister drew the conclusion that the
case was authority for the proposition that the statute does not envisage that any
duties of the employee must be performed in the house in which he is obliged to live
as a condition of his employment.
27 It is interesting to note that the majority opinion dispensed with any consideration
of this question, although the majority's opinion indicated that the place where an
employee performs a significant portion of his duties would be "business premises."
28 371 F.2d at 76.
29 321 F.2d at 912 (patrolmen had to advise their superior when and where they
stopped for food in order that they could be reached if needed).
30 See note 16 supra.
31 371 F.2d at 79.
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Under Section 119, to exclude the value of lodging from gross
income, three tests32 must be met: (1) The lodging must be furnished
for the convenience of the employer;3 3 (2) the employee must be
required to accept the lodging as a condition of his employment;3 4
and, (3) the lodging must be furnished on the business premises of
the employer. The definition of "on the business premises of the
employer" has been the subject of many diversified opinions by the
courts and writers.3 5 Morelan and Barrett indicated a liberal interpre-
tation of "business premises." Chamber of Commerce held that it was
enough that the premises were furnished by the employer and the
employee performed duties thereon. Dole took a somewhat similar
approach, holding that the living quarters must be either an integral
part of the business property or premises upon which the employer
carries on some business activities. And now, Anderson seems to take
the most narrow view, holding that the ownership of the property is
not significant and the test is that either the employee or the employer
must conduct a significant portion of their respective duties or business
on the premises.
It is arguable that the term "business premises" can be construed to
encompass premises acquired by the employer for business purposes
as well as premises where business is conducted. The major considera-
tion should be whether the lodging is furnished primarily for the
convenience of the employer or primarily for the convenience of the
employee.36 Narrow distinctions based on the distance to the site of
major activity, the extent of duties performed on the premises, and
the classification of the living quarters as an integral part of the
business property go to the element of convenience to the employer
or the employee; but they alone should not be determinative of the
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6745, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 42.
33 See generally Prigal, New Rule on Faculty Meals Extends Convenience-of-
Employer Exclusion, 14 J. TAXATION 149 (1961); Gutkin & Beck, Some Problems
in "Convenience of the Employer," 36 TAXES 153 (1958); Gornick, The 1954 Internal
Revenue Code: Sick Pay, Meals, Lodging, Salesmen's Expenses, 41 A.B.A.J. 612, 615
(1955).
34 See generally 5 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 474 (1964).
35 See generally Bailey, Compensation With the Fringe on Top, N.Y.U. 16th INST.
ON FED. TAX 75, 82 (1958) (predicting broad definition); Erbacher, Meals or
Lodging Furnished for Convenience of Employer, 32 TAXES 826 (1954) (expressing
doubt that Section 119 would end confusion).
3G See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 83D CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON SECTION 119
OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 (Comm. Print 1954): "Your committee has
provided that the basic test of exclusion is to be whether the meals or lodging are
furnished primarily for the convenience of the employer (and thus excludable) or
whether they were primarily for the convenience of the employee (and therefore
taxable)."
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question of excludability. Rather, such elements should be evidentiary
and used to assist the trier of fact in determining whether the premises
fulfill a business need of the employer and are for his convenience, or
whether the premises are merely owned by the employer and provided
to the employee for the latter's convenience. If the premises fulfill a
substantial business need, then they should be deemed "business
premises" within the meaning of Section 119. On the other hand, if
the property is merely owned by the employer, and the employee need
not reside there in order to properly perform his duties, then it would
seem that the premises are not for the convenience of the employer,
and not "business premises."
In the present case, the fact. that the dwelling was located upon
property separate and apart from the motel prevents the court from
saying that the lodging was provided on the business premises of the
employer even though there was no issue in Anderson that the meals
and lodging were furnished for the convenience of the employer.
While rigid adherence to the rule expressed by the majority has
the advantage of ease of application,37 possible future results might
be inconsistent. For example, a corporation could construct a dwelling
at a distant point on a large motel property, and the rental value
would be excludable from the manager's gross income. But if the
corporation chose to build a house directly across the street on prop-
erty not integrated with the motel property, then the rental value
would not be excludable, even though the dwelling might be much
nearer the manager's office than one constructed on a distant corner
of the motel property. But the "across-the-street manager" can yet
qualify for the exclusion-he merely ensures that he performs a
"significant portion" of his duties in his residence.
The court's intensive concern with the meaning of "on the business
premises" is unwarranted. The determinative question should be
whether the lodging was provided primarily for the convenience of
the employer. Duty, distance, integration, ownership, and condition
of employment should be considered merely as an aid in making that
determination.
JAMES B. FRANKLIN
37 Another equally workable solution is suggested in Fischer, Tax Free Income:
Compensation in Kind and Quasi-in-Kind, 5 Wk.. & MARY L. REV. 46 (1964) (tax-
free nature of meals and lodging should be abolished).
